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Politicians, philosophers, and rhetors engage in co-value argumentation: appealing to one
value in order to support another value (e.g., “equality leads to freedom”). Across four
experiments in the United Kingdom and India, we found that the psychological relatedness
of values affects the persuasiveness of the arguments that bind them. Experiment 1 found
that participants were more persuaded by arguments citing values that fulfilled similar
motives than by arguments citing opposing values. Experiments 2 and 3 replicated this
result using a wider variety of values, while finding that the effect is stronger among
people higher in need for cognition and that the effect is mediated by the greater
plausibility of co-value arguments that link motivationally compatible values. Experiment 4
extended the effect to real-world arguments taken from political propaganda and replicated
the mediating effect of argument plausibility. The findings highlight the importance of value
relatedness in argument persuasiveness.
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INTRODUCTION
“I will choose freedom because I think freedom leads to equality”
George W. Bush (as cited by Anderson, 1999; Anderson, own
italics)
Major political ideologies employ co-value argumentation: they
appeal to one value in order to support another value. The above
example uses the value of freedom to support equality; intrigu-
ingly, the 1847 manifesto of the Communist Party (Wheen, 1999)
conversely uses the value of equality to support freedom. These
are not isolated cases of co-value argumentation; appealing to
one social value to validate another unites people as diverse as
Plato, who stated that equality leads to friendship (Prangle, 1988),
and Howard Greenspan (Associated-Press, 1999), who stated that
“Honesty leads to success in life and business” (italics added).
Although there are a number of other important ways in which
values are embedded within argumentation (e.g., Tetlock et al.,
1997; Nelson, 2004), co-value argumentation has yet to receive
empirical scrutiny.
Two aspects of co-value argumentation make it interesting to
examine. First, as in the examples above, these arguments are
often quite simple and unelaborated, hardly ever saying why or
how two values are connected; it’s taken for granted that the
recipient will see the connection. Second, the use of co-value
argumentation provides people with a huge advantage: social
values are seen as important, they are generally viewed posi-
tively (Maio and Olson, 1998), and individuals attempt to behave
consistently with their values (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992;
Verplanken and Holland, 2002). It is therefore easy to see why
people frequently use co-value argumentation to advance an
argument.
However, it should also be important which values are paired
in such co-value arguments; not all statements involving val-
ues are likely to be equally persuasive. This issue is relevant
to an unresolved issue in the study of persuasion (Areni and
Lutz, 1988; Maio and Haddock, 2007): in a lot of real-world
argumentation, it can be unclear which attributes can be plau-
sibly linked to form a strong argument. From the perspective
of argumentation research, co-value argumentation constitutes
a form of consequentialist argument: “We should endorse X,
because it will bring about Y” (e.g., Hahn and Oaksford, 2007;
Corner et al., 2011). Such arguments invoke so-called “utility
conditionals” (e.g., Thompson et al., 2005; Evans et al., 2008;
Bonnefon, 2009), that is, conditionals (if-then statements) where
the antecedent (if X..), the consequent (then Y. . . ) or both
are associated with positive/negative utilities. As a class, such
arguments encompass warnings and threats as well as positive
recommendations, and their strength depends crucially on the
conditional probability, P(X|Y), that is, the extent to which Y
really will bring about X (see, e.g., Hahn and Oaksford, 2007,
2012).
Resonant with classic theories of attitude function
(Smith et al., 1956; Katz, 1960), the strength of co-value
argumentation should depend directly on the specific val-
ues highlighted by a message. Moreover, psychological
research on values should allow explanation and predic-
tion of which value combinations make strong arguments
and which do not. The present research focuses on this
issue.
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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ORGANIZATION OF VALUES
This potential role of the specific values can be understood by first
considering the psychological organization of values. The most
influential and empirically supported model was postulated by
Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz and Boehnke (2004). As shown in
Figure 1, the crucial feature that creates this model is the type of
motives that values express. These motives can vary in congru-
ence: actions taken in pursuit of one particular value have psycho-
logical, practical, and social consequences that may conflict with
the pursuit of another value or be compatible with its pursuit. In
the value structure, competing value types are in opposing posi-
tions around the circle, whereas compatible value types, which
fulfill similar motives, are in adjacent positions. This structure
is supported by patterns of correlations between ratings of the
importance of diverse values in over 70 nations (Schwartz, 2006).
Schwartz’s (1992) model of social values provides an impor-
tant theoretical context for the strength of instances of co-value
argumentation. The circumplex structure orders values accord-
ing to motivational congruence. Opposing values are classed as
such because the actions taken in their respective pursuit may
often conflict in consequence. In other words, pursuing one
value is likely to impinge negatively on the pursuit of the other.
Conversely, values that fulfill similar motives will be positively
correlated in terms of the consequences of actions one might take
in their pursuit; and, finally, values that are orthogonal will be
more or less independent.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CO-VALUE ARGUMENTS
The relative positions along the Schwartz circumplex translate
directly into probabilities: the conditional probability P(X|Y),
that is, the probability that X will obtain given Y, for two val-
ues X and Y, will vary systematically depending on their relative
location in Schwartz’s model. For opposing values, X and Y will
be negatively correlated: pursuing X is detrimental to the pur-
suit of Y, that is P(X|Y) will be less than P(X), whereas it will
be greater than P(X) for similar values. Schwartz’s model may
thus be combined with recent probabilistic approaches to argu-
ment quality/argument strength (see, e.g., Hahn and Oaksford,
2007, 2012) to provide principled, a priori predictions about the
relative convincingness of different consequentialist arguments
combining two values.
Two values should be more plausibly linked when they are
motivationally congruent than when they are not; compatibility
between congruent values more closely fits personal experience
and implicit theories about social values and behaviors. As a
result, people should be more persuaded by recommendations
based upon co-value argumentation involving similar values than
by recommendations based upon co-value argumentation involv-
ing dissimilar (unrelated or opposing) values. We call this the
congruence hypothesis.
Nevertheless, there are two reasons why this possibility is not
a foregone conclusion. First, the abstract nature of fundamental
values may render them permeable and “fuzzy,” thus people may
perceive associations even between opposing values. Indeed, the
abstract nature of social values enables politicians, speech writ-
ers, business leaders, and others to bring together opposing values
and hence appeal to a more diverse spectrum of people (Gordon
andMiller, 2004). Thus, people may regard arguments combining
diverse values as more compelling because of the sheer breadth
of interests that they cover, as noted by observers of political
FIGURE 1 | Schwartz’s (1992) model of values.
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rhetoric (Sanders and Hamilton, 2001). We label this possibility
the breadth hypothesis.
Second, people may consider other information while making
a judgment of persuasiveness. In the context of values, this may
include even the association between values in memory. Indeed,
there is evidence that motivationally similar and motivation-
ally opposing values are equally strongly associated in memory
(Pakizeh et al., 2007; Maio et al., 2009), independently of their
mere semantic relatedness (Pakizeh et al., 2007). Themotivational
associations may facilitate the transfer of information between
the values and, consequently, increase the strength of any argu-
ment that binds them. That is, arguments involving similar values
and arguments involving opposing values may both be more per-
suasive than arguments involving unrelated values because the
associations in memory between the similar and the opposing
values results in greater acceptance of the transfer of information
between them. We label this possibility the association hypothesis.
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
To test these congruence, breadth, and association hypotheses,
we presented participants in our research with arguments that
endorsed a target value because it promoted another value (the
“reason value”). For example, in Experiment 1, participants in
one experimental condition read, “we should encourage helpful-
ness because it will promote true friendship.” These two values
fulfilled similar motives (adjacent in the Schwartz circumplex).
We compared participants’ ratings of the strength of these argu-
ments with their ratings of the strength of arguments conjoining
values that served orthogonal or opposing motives. The results
of these comparisons then led to our second experiment, which
examined effects of co-value arguments across a wider range
of values, while examining the process mediating the obtained
effect of value motivations on ratings of argument cogency. The
third experiment then tested whether the findings are replica-
ble in a different culture, India, which is more collectivist in
orientation than the culture used in the first two experiments
(Britain). Finally, the fourth experiment tested whether the results
are applicable to understanding longer, more complex co-value
arguments.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 60 undergraduate psychology students (38
women, 14 men, and 8 who did not indicate gender) at a British
university, who participated for course credit.
Procedure
Participants were informed that they would be taking part in
two different “studies” that had been combined because they
were short. The experimenter randomly assigned the argu-
ment persuasiveness materials and the Schwartz (1992) Value
Survey to roles as the “first” or “second” study. After comple-
tion of these tasks, participants were debriefed and thanked.
During debriefing, no participants reported any suspicions
about the purpose of the research and the relatedness of the
values.
Manipulation of co-value arguments
All participants were presented with an argument for each of three
topics. Each argument claimed that encouraging a target value
has beneficial effects on behavior that promotes another value
(the reason value). The target value and the reason value served
either similar, orthogonal, or opposing motives in Schwartz’s
(1992) value system (see Table 1). Importantly, a pilot study of 21
participants suggested that the pairs of similar, orthogonal, and
opposing values did not differ significantly in value importance
when considered out of context of the arguments (all ps> 0.45).
The arguments were almost identical in context and structure
in order to reduce any possibility that participants’ evaluations of
persuasiveness were determined by factors other than the values
themselves. For example, one statement cited one of three benefits
of creativity:
“Research conducted by the Arts Council has found that increas-
ing people’s creativity has beneficial effects. The studies found that
encouraging people to be more creative increases their [curiosity
in new ideas and methods/ influence and impact on others/ their
sense of social order and stability in society].”
As in the examples provided at the beginning of this paper, the
statements were all simple in structure, never stating why or how
the two values are connected. To reduce task demands that would
have arisen from repeated exposure to the same arguments with
alternative reason values, we used three target values (creativity,
helpfulness, self-discipline) and, in a Latin Square Confounded
design (Kirk, 1995), presented participants (in random order)
with one argument for each target value, paired with a similar,
orthogonal or opposing value, and counterbalanced such that
each participant saw one example of each of these value relation-
ships (see Table 1). The order of presentation of the statements
was randomized.
Measures
Value importance. The Schwartz (1992) Value Survey asked par-
ticipants to rate the importance of 56 social values as a guiding
principle in their life. Each value was presented with a stan-
dardized definition from the Schwartz Value Survey, and the list
included all of the 12 values (both target and reason values)
involved in the manipulation of value relatedness (along with
the 44 others). The value ratings were then made using a scale
from −1 (“opposed to my values”) to 7 (“extremely important”).
Argument persuasiveness. After exposure to the arguments, par-
ticipants were asked to underline the portion of the paragraph
Table 1 | Experiment 1: similar, orthogonal, and opposing “reason
values” from the Schwartz (1992) circular model used in the
manipulation of arguments.
Target value Similar Orthogonal Opposing
Creativity Curiosity Social influence Social order
Helpfulness True friendship Freedom Success
Self-discipline Politeness Broadmindedness Enjoyment of life
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that they considered to be the reason for encouraging the tar-
get value. This task ensured that participants processed the
whole argument (Langer et al., 1978). Next, participants com-
pleted four questions to assess the persuasiveness of the argu-
ments: “To what extent do you find this reason persuasive?”,
“How convinced were you by the argument that [creativity/
helpfulness/self-discipline] is a good thing?” “To what extent
were you convinced that [creativity/ helpfulness/ self-discipline]
is good specifically because it increases behavior consistent with
[curiosity in new ideas and methods/ influence and impact on
others/ their sense of social order and stability in society]?”
and “To what extent do you agree with the report’s posi-
tion that [creativity/ helpfulness/self-discipline] is important?”.
Participants responded using 10-point scales from 1 (not at all) to
10 (extremely), and responses to these four questions were aver-
aged to create a single measure of persuasion (average α = 0.81).
Participants were also asked to list any other factors that made
the argument persuasive, but most provided no additional infor-
mation (and none alluded to conflicts of consequences between
values).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Persuasiveness
The Latin Square Confounded technique provided us with par-
ticipants’ argument persuasiveness ratings for each level of value
relatedness. These ratings were analyzed using a repeated mea-
sures ANOVA, which revealed an effect of value relatedness on
participants’ ratings of argument persuasiveness, F(2, 118) = 4.13,
p < 0.05. As shown in Figure 2, participants were more per-
suaded by arguments involving similar value motives (M = 6.48)
than by arguments involving values that served orthogonal (M =
6.02), t(59) = 2.01, p < 0.05, d = 0.52, or opposing motives
(M = 5.75), t(59) = 2.89, p < 0.005, d = 0.75. There was no sig-
nificant difference between arguments involving orthogonal and
opposing values, t(59) = 0.94, p < 0.36, d = 0.24. Thus, partici-
pants found arguments involving similar values more persuasive
than arguments involving orthogonal or opposing values.
FIGURE 2 | Persuasiveness as a function of motivational compatibility
between values in Experiment 1.
Role of value importance
We also examined participants’ mean ratings of the importance
of the target and reason values (i.e., creativity and curiosity / true
friendship / politeness, in the “similar” condition; helpfulness and
social influence / freedom / broadmindedness in the “orthogonal”
condition; self-discipline and social order / success / enjoyment
of life in the “opposing” condition) using a three-level (similar vs.
orthogonal vs. opposing) repeated measures ANOVA. There were
no significant differences in value importance across the three
types of value relatedness, F(2, 116) = 0.84, p > 0.4. Therefore, the
relatedness effect on argument persuasiveness was not driven by
spurious differences in the importance of the values across the
value relatedness conditions.
Summary
These results provided the first evidence that argument persua-
siveness is affected by value relatedness. Of the three hypotheses
described in the Introduction, the pattern predicted by the con-
gruence hypothesis was evident in the results. Specifically, par-
ticipants were more persuaded by arguments involving similar
value motives than by arguments involving orthogonal or oppos-
ing values. This result indicates that appealing to diverse motives
does come at a cost, and it is consistent with extant evidence
about the transfer of information between categories of a non-
emotional-motivational nature, thereby providing a link between
the cognitive research on reasoning and research on persuasion.
EXPERIMENT 2
Given the provocative evidence from Experiment 1, our second
experiment examined three additional issues. First, we wished to
test whether the previous effects of value relatedness on the rated
strength of co-value arguments could be replicated using a design
with random pairs of values sampled from around the circular
model. Using multilevel modeling, we could also use this method
to examine effects of particular value pairs and to test the effects
of value relatedness independently of any differences in particular
pairs (i.e., the extent to which any pair that is highly related shows
similar effects).
Second, we tested the hypothesis that similar values may be
more persuasive because their linkage is more plausible and fitting
with personal experience. One important reason to examine the
role of plausibility in consequentialist arguments, such as co-value
argumentation, is that consequentialist arguments are influenced
both by the importance attached to the cited consequence and
by the probability that the action will indeed bring about this
consequence (see Hahn and Oaksford, 2007, for detailed anal-
ysis). Implausible arguments are those where the action is seen
to be unlikely to lead to the consequence. Yet, consistent with
expectancy-valence perspectives on attitudes and values (Feather,
1995), even plausible arguments, where the action-consequence
link is likely, can be unpersuasive if one does not care much
about the consequences (e.g., “we should ban cannabis, because
cannabis use tends to elicit changes in music preference”). This
separation of plausibility and importance is vital because val-
ues already inherently convey degrees of importance, and we
have shown that their importance is not driving the similarity
effect in value co-argumentation. Thus, changes in plausibility
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are the principal salient alternate path for value linkages to
operate.
Finally, we wished to test whether the effect of value relatedness
on acceptance of co-value arguments is augmented or dimin-
ished by inclinations to think deeply about the arguments. If value
relatedness shapes attitudes even when people are carefully scru-
tinizing value relatedness, it would appear that value relatedness
is not simply a default, automatic heuristic, but is an aspect of
argument structure that people find useful and rational. For this
reason, we included a measure of need for cognition (Cacioppo
et al., 1984). This measure taps individual differences in the desire
to engage in effortful cognitive activity.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 50 undergraduate students (47 women and 3
men) at Cardiff University, who took part for course credit.
Procedure
Participants took part individually, and all of the materials were
presented using a computer. Participants first rated their agree-
ment with and plausibility of 20 co-value arguments and then
completed the 18-item Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo et al.,
1984). Participants were then debriefed and thanked for their
participation.
Manipulation of co-value arguments
Examples of the co-value arguments include “Obedience pro-
motes Success” and “National Security promotes Justice.” The
computer generated the arguments by randomly selecting pairs of
values from a larger set of 24 values. This set included two or three
values from each of the 10 motivational domains in Schwartz’s
(1992) model, with the larger number of values drawn from the
larger value domains (e.g., benevolence, self-direction). No par-
ticipant received the exact same value pairings in their 20 co-value
arguments.
We estimated the degrees of relatedness between each value
pair that was presented to each participant by manually cal-
culating the angle distance between values in the two dimen-
sional model of individual-level value structure averaged across
20 countries (see Figure 2 in Schwartz, 1992). The estimated
angles varied between 0 and 180◦ (e.g., creativity-honesty= 110◦,
authority-equality = 180◦).
Measures
Agreement and plausibility. Below each co-value argument, par-
ticipants were asked, “How much do you agree with this state-
ment?” Participants rated their agreement using a 5-point scale
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). After completing
this rating, participants were asked, “How plausible did you find
the statement?” Plausibility was rated using a 5-point scale from
1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).
Need for cognition. After responding to the co-value arguments,
participants completed the 18-item Need for Cognition Scale
(Cacioppo et al., 1984). Example items are “I find satisfaction in
deliberating hard and for long hours,” “The notion of thinking
abstractly is appealing to me,” and “Thinking is not my idea of
fun.” Participants responded to each item using a 7-point scale
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). We calculated
participants’ need for cognition as the average score across items,
after appropriate reverse-scoring (α = 0.87).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We used multilevel modeling to analyse these data. The responses
of one particular participant for one particular value pair are the
level 1 units. Participants and value pairs are both level 2 units:
each response is nested within participants and within value pairs.
In all multilevel models the intercept contains a random effect
for participants and a random effect for value pairs. The ran-
dom effect for participants tests whether some participants have
higher scores than others (across value pairs). The random effect
for value pairs tests whether some value pairs have higher scores
than others (across participants). Such a cross-classified struc-
ture is appropriate because we wish to generalize our results to all
value pairs and all people (see Baayen et al., 2008). Relatedness
and need for cognition (M = 3.21, SD = 0.946) scores were
transformed to scores between 1 and 5, as is the case for
plausibility, in order to make the regression coefficients more
comparable.
We analyzed the extent to which people agreed with each value
pair. InModel 1, we added relatedness to themodel, and this was a
strong predictor of agreement (see Table 2). InModel 2, we added
need for cognition and the interaction between relatedness and
need for cognition. Need for cognition did not affect agreement,
but there was a significant interaction between need for cognition
and relatedness. Follow-up simple effects analysis indicated that
relatedness was positively related to agreement for people scor-
ing one standard deviation above (B = 0.30, p < 0.001) and one
standard deviation below the mean of need for cognition (B =
0.16, p < 0.001), but the effect was stronger for people high in
need for cognition. Consequently, we tested a model of mediated
moderation (see Muller et al., 2005).
In Model 3 we added plausibility, the proposed mediator, to
the model. Plausibility scores were grand-mean centered. We also
added an interaction between need for cognition and plausibility
to themodel, but did not have specific predictions for this interac-
tion. The plausibility scores were positively related to agreement
and this effect was not qualified by need for cognition (see Model
3 in Table 2). Adding plausibility (i.e., the mediator) to the model
reduced the effect of relatedness (i.e., the independent variable)
and the interaction between relatedness and need for cognition,
which is consistent with mediation.
The mediation path that we have not dealt with yet is the effect
of relatedness (the independent variable) and its interaction with
need for cognition, on plausibility (the mediator). Relatedness
affected plausibility (B = 0.21, p < 0.001), an effect that was
qualified by an interaction with need for cognition (B = 0.10,
p < 0.001). Value pairs that are more closely related according
to Schwartz’ model were indeed judged to be more plausible.
However, participants high in need for cognition were more sen-
sitive (i.e., reacted more strongly) to the relatedness of value pairs,
compared to people low in need for cognition. Simple slope anal-
ysis showed that the relation between relatedness and plausibility
is positive and significant for participants one standard deviation
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Table 2 | Experiment 2: multilevel modeling results (standard errors between brackets).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
FIXED PARAMETERS
Intercept 3.24 (0.068) 3.24 (0.068) 3.227 (0.044)
Relatedness 0.230*** (0.040) 0.229*** (0.040) 0.073** (0.023)
Need for cognition (NFC) 0.066 (0.059) 0.058 (0.044)
Relatedness*NFC 0.073** (0.028) −0.004 (0.021)
Plausibility 0.753*** (0.024)
Plausibility*NFC 0.007 (0.024)
RANDOM PARAMETERS
Participant variance 0.099 (0.031) 0.098 (0.031) 0.056 (0.018)
Value pair variance 0.346 (0.057) 0.347 (0.057) 0.049 (0.019)
Residual variance 0.960 (0.050) 0.954 (0.050) 0.580 (0.030)
Estimates are unstandardized multilevel regression coefficients. In order to obtain standardized effect sizes, divide the unstandardized coefficients by the square
root of the residual variance of Model 1. **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
above (B = 0.30, p < 0.001) and one standard deviation below
the mean of need for cognition (B = 0.12, p < 0.01).
The significance of indirect effects of relatedness through plau-
sibility on agreement was calculated using the coefficients that
have been presented above and the Prodclin programme, which
estimates asymmetric confidence intervals appropriate for indi-
rect effects (see Pituch et al., 2006; MacKinnon et al., 2007). The
indirect effect for plausibility was 0.23 (95% confidence inter-
val [0.16; 0.30]) for participants high in need for cognition and
0.09 (95% confidence interval [0.02; 0.15]) for participants low
in need for cognition.
In sum, the congruence hypothesis was again supported by the
results: participants were more persuaded by arguments involving
similar value motives than by arguments involving orthogonal or
opposing values. This finding emerged using a design with ran-
dom pairs of values sampled from around the circular model,
analyzed using multilevel modeling. In addition, the multilevel
mediational analysis supported the hypothesis that similar values
may be more persuasive because their linkage is more plausi-
ble and fitting with personal experience. This mechanism was
important in participants who were low in need for cognition
and among participants high in need for cognition, but the overall
impact of relatedness (through plausibility) was stronger among
participants higher in need for cognition. Thus, value similarity is
particularly important among people who are more likely to care-
fully scrutinize the arguments, suggesting that this similarity may
be an aspect of argument structure that people find useful and
rational.
EXPERIMENT 3
A limitation of Experiments 1 and 2 is that both were con-
ducted in a single, Western nation, the United Kingdom. It is
well documented that cultures differ in the priority they place
on individualistic and collectivist ideologies, which has ramifi-
cations for cross-cultural differences between values (Schwartz,
1990; Triandis, 1995). It has been argued that many collectivist
cultures also tend to place less emphasis on linear logical think-
ing, instead embracing a dialectical cognitive framework (Nisbett
et al., 2001; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010). Notwithstanding these
cultural differences, evidence testing the circular model of val-
ues has found that relations between values are similar in most
nations (Schwartz, 1992, 2006). Thus, from the perspective of the
circular model, the effects of co-value arguments should also be
similar in different cultures. Experiment 3 tested this implica-
tion by attempting to replicate the findings of Experiment 2 in
a relatively collectivist nation, India (Suh et al., 2014).
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 100 undergraduate students (49 women, 51
men) at Karnatak University, who participated for course credit.
Procedure
Participants took part in groups from 5 to 18. The procedure
was similar to Experiment 2, except that practical constraints
prevented us from presenting the materials using a computer.
This constraint made it difficult to randomly create the co-value
arguments for each participant. Given the robust findings across
different sets of co-value arguments in Experiment 2, we instead
gave all participants the same set of 20 randomly generated co-
value arguments in a single random order. (Value relatedness
was calculated in the same way as in Experiment 2.) Below
each co-value argument, participants rated their agreement using
the same 5-point scale as in Experiment 2. After completing
this rating, participants rated the plausibility of the argument
using a 3-point scale, from 1 (not at all) to 3 (strongly). After
responding to the co-value arguments, participants completed the
18-item Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo et al., 1984), as in
Experiment 2 (α = 0.66). Participants were then debriefed and
thanked for their participation.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As in Experiment 2, relatedness, need for cognition (M = 2.68,
SD = 0.739), and plausibility values were recoded to values
between 1 and 5. The data were analyzed with the same mul-
tilevel models as in Experiment 2. In contrast to Experiment 2,
relatedness did not have a main effect on agreement (see Model
1 in Table 3). In Model 2, we added need for cognition and the
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Table 3 | Experiment 3: multilevel modeling results (standard errors between brackets).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
FIXED PARAMETERS
Intercept 4.109 (0.065) 4.109 (0.065) 4.105 (0.041)
Relatedness 0.059 (0.039) 0.059 (0.039) 0.016 (0.022)
Need for cognition (NFC) 0.082 (0.052) 0.034 (0.042)
Relatedness*NFC 0.048** (0.018) 0.024 (0.015)
Plausibility 0.462*** (0.014)
Plausibility*NFC 0.085*** (0.018)
RANDOM PARAMETERS
Participant variance 0.112 (0.021) 0.110 (0.021) 0.072 (0.014)
Value pair variance 0.055 (0.021) 0.055 (0.021) 0.015 (0.007)
Residual variance 0.770 (0.025) 0.768 (0.025) 0.504 (0.016)
Estimates are unstandardized multilevel regression coefficients. In order to obtain standardized effect sizes, divide the unstandardized coefficients by the square
root of the residual variance of Model 1. **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
interaction between relatedness and need for cognition. Need
for cognition did not affect agreement, but there was a signifi-
cant interaction between need for cognition and relatedness. The
direction of this interaction was the same as in Experiment 2, and
relatedness was positively related to agreement for people scoring
one standard deviation above (B = 0.09, p = 0.03) and one stan-
dard deviation below the mean of need for cognition (B = 0.02,
p = 0.58), although the latter simple slope was not statistically
significant.
Model 3 added plausibility to the model. We also added inter-
action terms between need for cognition and plausibility to the
model. Plausibility was positively related to agreement but there
was also an interaction between plausibility and need for cog-
nition (see Model 3 in Table 3). The positive relation between
plausibility and agreement was stronger for people at one stan-
dard deviation above the mean of need for cognition (B = 0.52,
p < 0.001) than for people one standard deviation below the
mean of need for cognition (B = 0.40, p < 0.001). This interac-
tion between plausibility and need for cognition was close to zero
in Experiment 2. The weaker effect of plausibility in Experiment 3
compared to Experiment 2 and the interaction with need for cog-
nition could be due to genuine differences between the UK and
India in terms of a tendency for less of a linear analytic style
of thinking in collectivist cultures (Nisbett et al., 2001; Spencer-
Rodgers et al., 2010). However, they could also be related to our
use of a 3-point scale for plausibility in Experiment 3 compared
to a 5-point scale in Experiment 2.
Regarding mediation, adding plausibility to the model made
the interaction between relatedness and need for cognition
non-significant. We continued the mediation analysis as in
Experiment 2 and analyzed whether relatedness affected plausi-
bility (the mediator). Relatedness had a near-significant effect on
plausibility (B = 0.09, p = 0.051). In contrast to Experiment 2,
the effect of relatedness on plausibility was not qualified by an
interaction with need for cognition in this analysis (B = 0.03,
p = 0.25).
The significance of indirect effects of relatedness through
plausibility on agreement was calculated in the same way as in
Experiment 2. The indirect effect for plausibility was 0.05 (95%
confidence interval [0.01; 0.11]) for participants high in need
for cognition and 0.03 (95% confidence interval [−0.01; 0.07])
for participants low in need for cognition. Thus, the indirect
effect was only significant for participants high in need for cog-
nition, which is the same pattern as for the effect of relatedness
on agreement.
In sum, Experiment 3’s Indian sample replicated the main
results from Experiment 2’s British sample: participants were
more persuaded by arguments involving similar value motives
than by arguments involving orthogonal or opposing values,
albeit only for participants high in need for cognition. This find-
ing again emerged using a design with random pairs of values
sampled from around the circular model, analyzed using multi-
level modeling. In addition, the effect of value similarity was again
stronger among participants high in need for cognition than
among participants low in need for cognition, with argument
plausibility playing a mediating role. Thus, value similarity was
more important among people who are more likely to carefully
scrutinize the arguments, despite the change of culture.
EXPERIMENT 4
Experiment 4 attempted to demonstrate the relevance of our find-
ings for real-world argumentation. Although the simple style of
the arguments used in Experiments 1, 2, and 3 are consistent with
plentiful examples of co-value argumentation in philosophy, pol-
itics, and rhetoric, such arguments are also frequently embedded
within other information. This is important when considered in
connection with the findings of Experiments 2 and 3, wherein
participants who were more likely to enjoy effortful cognitive
tasks exhibited stronger effects of value relatedness on their accep-
tance of the simple co-value arguments. The fact that effortful
thought aided the success of the arguments suggests that effects
value relatedness should also occur if the co-value arguments are
longer and more complex.
To examine this issue, Experiment 4 examined the effects
of value relatedness within a realistic piece of political propa-
ganda, embedding the value argument in a real-world persuasion
context. To achieve this aim, actual policy statements from a
British political party were slightly modified and presented to
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participants. Participants rated the persuasiveness of the policy
statements (arguments) they received and the importance of the
reason and target values to them personally. Because we had
already shown the value relatedness effect across numerous pairs
of social values, participants in this experiment were presented
with only one argument, which either involved similar or oppos-
ing motives. Our aim was to show that relatedness could have the
same effects on plausibility and agreement even when embedded
in a longer political argument.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 82 undergraduate students at a British uni-
versity, who were paid £1 for their participation, in a coffee
shop.
Procedure
Participants completed a questionnaire containing the manip-
ulation of co-value argumentation, followed by measures of
argument persuasiveness, argument plausibility, and value impor-
tance. Participants were then debriefed and thanked for their
participation.
Manipulation of co-value argumentation
The manipulation exposed participants to a policy statement that
was taken from the political manifesto of a British political party.
To avoid the influence of affiliations to a British party, all partic-
ipants were informed that this policy statement was taken from
the (fictional) FDP party in Australia. The policy related to social
justice, and we manipulated whether it was supported by a sim-
ilar social value (broadmindedness) or an opposing social value
(wealth). The similar-value policy statement is shown below:
“FDP is the party of social justice and broadmindedness. Reforms
introduced by the FDP have built a fairer and more just society.
Our country now has the most comprehensive social justice legis-
lation in the United Nations and our commitment to protection
for every citizen is also enshrined in the 1998 Human Rights Act.
In addition, we have introduced a range of policies which pro-
tect people from discrimination on the grounds of disability, help
more disabled people to find and stay in work and support those
whose disabilities mean they are unable to work.
We know that legislation alone cannot achieve the systemic
and cultural changes we need to make diversity and human rights
core values in our society. So, in order to bring about measur-
able improvement in the position of those who are discriminated
against, we believe that all our citizens should receive education
that encourages them to be broadminded and tolerant in every
aspect of their lives. Increasing broadmindedness will increase the
fairness of our society.”
The opposing-value policy statement was the same, except that
the first sentence became “FDP is the party of social justice and
wealth” and the last two sentences were as follows:
“So, in order to bring about measurable improvement in the posi-
tion of those who are discriminated against, we believe that all our
citizens should be able to strive to secure greater wealth through
every aspect of their lives. Increasing the pursuit of wealth will
increase the fairness of our society.”
Measures
Argument persuasiveness. The argument persuasiveness mea-
sures included four questions: “How persuaded were you by this
policy statement?,” “How convinced were you by this policy state-
ment?,” “If all other variables were equal, would you vote for this
party on the basis of this policy statement?,” and “Aside from how
important you consider these issues to be, how strong do you
find this policy statement?” Participants answered these questions
using 10-point scales from 1 (not at all) to 10 (extremely) or from
1 (not at all) to 10 (definitely) (α = 0.82).
Argument plausibility. Participants completed two questions that
assessed the plausibility of the argument: “How plausible did you
find this policy statement?” and “To what extent do you find this
policy statement believable?” Participants answered these ques-
tions on 10-point scales from 1 (not at all) to 10 (extremely)
(r = 0.63).
Value importance. Participants rated the importance of the target
and reason values (wealth, broadmindedness, and social justice)
using the same scale as described in Experiment 1. These were
interspersed among nine filler values from around Schwartz’s
model.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Argument persuasiveness
A One-Way (value relatedness: similar vs. opposing) ANOVA
was conducted on participants’ ratings of argument persuasive-
ness. Again, participants were more persuaded by the political
policy statement that cited values serving similar motives (M =
5.99) than by the statement using opposing values (M = 5.13),
F(1, 80) = 7.65, p < 0.01, d = 0.62.
Value importance
The correlations between target and reason value importance
and persuasiveness and plausibility were non-significant (all ps>
0.25). Also, a regression analysis revealed that participants were
more persuaded by the policy statement that cited a similar value
in support of social justice than by the policy statement that cited
an opposing value, even after controlling for the importance of
both target and reason values, b = 0.94, t(78) = 2.96, p < 0.005.
Therefore, value importance again did not account for the link
between value relatedness and argument persuasiveness.
Argument plausibility
To investigate our hypothesis that the plausibility of the argument
plays a role in the relatedness effect, we tested whether partici-
pants found the policy statements to be differentially plausible.
A One-Way (value relatedness: similar vs. opposing) ANOVA
revealed that there was a significant effect of the experimental
manipulation on participants’ ratings of argument plausibility,
F(1, 80) = 11.35, p < 0.001, d = 0.75. Consistent with the effects
on the argument persuasiveness ratings, participants found the
policy citing similar values to be more plausible (M = 5.83) than
the policy citing opposing values (M = 4.79).
Baron and Kenny’s (1986) three-step test of mediation were
then applied (see Figure 3). Consistent with the ANOVAs above,
Frontiers in Psychology | Personality and Social Psychology August 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 829 | 8
Maio et al. Co-value argumentation
FIGURE 3 | Path diagram showing the mediational link between value
relatedness and argument persuasiveness via plausibility
(standardized regression coefficients) in Experiment 4.
regression analyses indicated that value relatedness significantly
predicted participants’ ratings of argument plausibility (media-
tor), b = 1.04, t(80) = 3.37, p < 0.001, and that value relatedness
significantly predicted participants’ argument persuasiveness rat-
ings, b = 0.86, t(80) = 2.77, p < 0.01. In addition, a regression
analysis that included value relatedness and argument plausibility
as simultaneous predictors of argument persuasiveness revealed
a significant effect of argument plausibility on argument persua-
siveness, b = 0.61, t(80) = 6.73, p < 0.0001, while the influence
of value relatedness was reduced to non-significance, b = 0.23,
t(79) = 0.85, p < 0.40. The Sobel test confirmed mediation, z =
3.01, p < 0.003.
It is also worth noting that our measure of argument per-
suasiveness included a question relating to behavioral intention:
participants’ likelihood of voting for the party on the basis of this
policy statement. Regression analyses using this measure as the
dependent variable revealed an identical pattern of mediation.
That is, consistent with the second requirement of mediation (the
first requirement was the same as in the above analysis), value
relatedness significantly predicted participants’ willingness to
vote for the party, b = 1.15, t(80) = 2.55, p < 0.02. In addition,
argument plausibility significantly predicted participants’ voting
preference, b = 0.60, t(79) = 4.50, p < 0.001, and reduced the
influence of value relatedness to non-significance, b = 0.56,
t(79) = 1.32, p < 0.19. The Sobel test also confirmed mediation,
z = 2.71, p < 0.01. Thus, participants who received the argu-
ment that used similar values were more willing to vote for this
party than participants who received the argument that used
opposing values, because they found the similar value arguments
more plausible.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across four experiments, we investigated the impact of the
psychological relation between values on the persuasiveness of
co-value arguments. Experiment 1 revealed that people are more
persuaded by arguments involving similar values than by argu-
ments involving orthogonal or opposing values. Experiment 2
replicated this effect in a multilevel analysis using random pairs
of values, while also finding that the effect is increased by
deep thought about the arguments (as indexed by individual
differences in need for cognition) and mediated by tendencies
to see links between compatible values as being more plausi-
ble. Experiment 3 extended these conclusions to a sample in a
nation with a relatively collectivist ideology. Finally, using real-life
persuasive arguments derived from political policy statements,
Experiment 4 again found a significant effect of value-relatedness
on ratings of argument strength, while providing further sup-
port for the hypothesis that the effects of value relatedness on
persuasion occur through its influence on the plausibility of the
argument.
Together, these results indicate that the motivational
compatibility of values plays an important role in co-value
argumentation. This research has provided the first direct
empirical examination of co-value argumentation and indicates
that value relatedness can now be used as an a priori predictor
of argument persuasiveness. An important implication of this
evidence is that, although appealing to diverse values may have
the positive outcome of appealing to a more diverse range
of voters (Gordon and Miller, 2004), the effectiveness of this
strategy may be undermined by a reduction in the persuasiveness
of the arguments to the audience. When arguments contained
similar values as support for each other, participants in our
research perceived the arguments linking the values as more
plausible and hence showed more agreement with the arguments.
This was true across a wide variety of values, using two-sentence
arguments about research findings, and using complex policy
statements taken from political party literature.
Of course, our designs possessed some limitations. For
instance, we always measured argument agreement before argu-
ment plausibility ratings because our principal interest was in
the agreement variable. Thus, we wished to obtain untainted
agreement ratings. We wanted these to appear first so that par-
ticipants did not feel as though the agreement had to follow from
the plausibility ratings. Nevertheless, it would be useful to have
comparison data with the plausibility ratings first.
Also, our designs did not test whether the effects of value relat-
edness are moderated by the importance of the value that is being
promoted. Prior research on attitude function matching in per-
suasion has found that messages are more persuasive when they
promote a value that a person cherishes, rather than an irrelevant
concern (DeBono, 2000; Maio and Olson, 2000). These effects
appear to rely, in part, on the ability of message matching to
elicit greater scrutiny of the message (Petty and Wegener, 1998;
Blankenship and Wegener, 2008). Given that the present effects
are facilitated by deep thought (Experiments 2 and 3) and are
present even for more complex messages (Experiment 4), it is
conceivable that the effect of value relatedness is even stronger
when the arguments concern values that are considered to be
highly important than when the arguments concern values are
considered to be less important. Recall, however, that the effects
of value relatedness were unattributable to differences in value
importance in the two experiments (1 and 4) where we col-
lected data on value importance for the target and reason values.
Nonetheless, neither study had sufficient power to detect differ-
ences in the effects of value relatedness at different levels of value
importance (i.e., the moderation effect). To address this issue
robustly, future research will need to consider pre-argument value
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importance across a variety of values and value pairs. At the same
time, however, the research would have to measure prior value
importance for both the target value and the supporting value.
Such an approach would require additional measures in a design
that avoids complications from priming value importance (e.g.,
by separating measures over time), and multilevel modeling that
is more complex than we employed here.
The integration of ideas from recent reasoning and argu-
mentation research within cognitive psychology and research on
values in the social domain raises other provocative avenues to
explore. For instance, one interesting issue is whether the effects
of value relatedness depend on the source of the arguments. Are
these effects greater or weaker when people are processing an
argument endorsing a value, but from a source that they dis-
like? For instance, our results indicate that people should be more
likely to agree that forgiveness promotes helpfulness (motivation-
ally congruent values) than to agree that forgiveness promotes
power (motivationally opposing values). An interesting question
is whether such a difference would not emerge when the source
is a group or person who is disliked. If the statements come
from a disliked political group, for instance, they may elicit less
attention and therefore a lower effect of value relatedness. At
the same time, we may distrust abstract statements from disliked
groups, because we are suspicious of their concrete instantia-
tions of the values at stake. This effect would be ironic, because
shared perspectives on values are potential means for bridging
gaps between opposing factions, but not if a distrust of the sources
leads to less appreciation of the sentiments. This issue is impor-
tant because there is considerable evidence for diverse effects of
argument sources on persuasion, operating through effects on
the valence of reactions to message arguments (see Petty and
Wegener, 1999) and meta-cognitive confidence in those reac-
tions (e.g., Petty et al., 2007; Tormala et al., 2007; Briñol and
Petty, 2009). The role of source characteristics has also drawn
the attention of cognitive psychologists concerned with argument
strength (e.g., Corner and Hahn, 2009; Hahn et al., 2009; Harris
and Hahn, 2009; Harris et al., 2012; Lagnado et al., 2012), giving
rise to complementary perspectives that would benefit from closer
integration.
It would also be useful to consider the potential of different
models of values to predict the acceptability of co-value argu-
ments. Our approach was based on Schwartz’s model because
of its explicit predictions about motivational conflicts and com-
patibilities between values. Other important models do not posit
suchmotivational conflicts and compatibilities, but they have dis-
tinctions that are also worth investigating. For example, Rokeach
(1973) distinguishes between instrumental (ways of acting; e.g.,
helpfulness) and terminal values (ends states of existence; e.g.,
freedom), and it is plausible that the instrumental values are more
convincing as argumentative antecedents than are terminal val-
ues. In addition, Trapnell and Paulhus (2012) distinguish between
values dedicated to social communion with others versus val-
ues aimed at personal agency and accomplishment, and there is
evidence that famous people who use agentic values as means
to communal values are more likely to be regarded as moral
heroes than famous individuals who pursue agency as its own
goal (Frimer et al., 2012). Thus, although our research was not
designed to examine these distinctions between values, they may
also affect the extent to which co-value arguments are persuasive.
Notwithstanding these issues for future research, the present
evidence consistently revealed that it is now possible to predict
which arguments will be seen as more compelling, based on
their connections to values. This has important ramifications for
understanding political attitudes and their connections to val-
ues. Returning to the example in the beginning of this paper,
it seems that both the 19th Century Communist Party and a
former US President fortuitously linked values that are motiva-
tionally congruent. People value the consistency and plausibility
that such motivational congruence provides, and this may be
a major mechanism through which complex assertions about
values become compelling or not.
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